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Abstract 
The Nile Basin has long been noted as a potential flashpoint for resource 
conflict on account of the prevalence of inequitable water utilization and 
acrimonious inter-riparian relations. The basin’s proneness to conflict has been 
exacerbated by the absence of an inclusive legal and institutional framework 
governing the utilization and management of its meager water resources. 
Unilateralism and incompatible riparian claims negating the fundamentals of 
international water law still continue to be the defining features of the basin. 
Launched in such a setting, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 
constitutes a significant counter-hegemonic measure capable of inducing a 
positive transformation in the basin’s inequitable status quo. A lasting solution 
which would ensure the equitable and sustainable utilization of the Nile waters 
for the benefit of all is, however, still elusive as the signing of the Declaration 
of Principles (DoP) poses challenges which might arguably neutralize the 
transformative impact of the GERD and entail institutionalization of the status 
quo. 
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Introduction 
Cooperative development and utilization of transboundary watercourses carries 
enormous potential economic benefits for riparian states. In the absence of 
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cooperation where competition and unilateral actions often constitute the modus 
operandi, trans-boundary watercourses pose huge risk of being cause for 
conflict. The enormity of the potential benefits and the seriousness of the risk 
are, arguably, more evident in the Nile basin than in other major international 
basins.  
According to Sadoff and Grey, cooperation offers riparian states a wide 
spectrum of benefits of an economic, environmental and political nature.1 In the 
Nile basin, the economic value of cooperation involving limited infrastructure 
development in the Blue Nile sub-basin has been estimated to be between USD 
1.15 billion and 1.97 billion.2 Utilization of Nile water for irrigation and 
hydroelectric power generation has been estimated to generate an annual gross 
economic benefit to the tune of USD 11 billion.3 
Tapping the enormous potential benefits of the Nile waters through 
cooperative development and equitable utilization requires overcoming the 
many challenges which not only make realization of these benefits extremely 
difficult but also aggravate the basin’s proneness to conflict. The difficult 
hydrologic environment of the basin,4 especially the relatively small discharge,5 
the hegemonic hydro-political configuration prevalent in the basin,6 the 
                                           
1 C. Sadoff & D. Grey (2002), “Beyond the River: The Benefits of Cooperation on 
International Rivers”, 4 Water Policy, pp. 389-403. The authors point out four major 
benefits of cooperation: benefits to the river, benefits from the river, reducing costs 
because of the river, and benefits beyond the river. 
2 D. Whittington, X. Wu & C. Sadoff (2005), “Water Resources Management in the Nile 
Basin: The Economic Value of Cooperation”, 7Water Policy, p. 249.  
3  Ibid. 
4 D. Grey & C. Sadoff (2007), “Sink or Swim? Water Security for Growth and 
Development”, 9 Water Policy, p. 548. The hydrologic environment of a basin which 
refers to “the absolute level of water resource availability, its inter- and intra-annual 
variability and its spatial distribution” is said to be difficult “where rainfall is markedly 
seasonal – a short season of torrential rain followed by a long dry season [which] requires 
the storage of water; or where there is high inter-annual climate variability, where 
extremes of flood and drought create unpredictable risks to individuals and communities 
and to nations and regions and require over-year water storage.” Ibid., p. 549. 
5  N. Kliot (1994), Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, (London, Rutledge), p. 
13. The 84 billion cubic metres annual flow of the Nile is the lowest discharge of 
comparable large rivers. R. Collins (2002), The Nile (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press), p. 11, gives a figurative description of the small flow of the Nile which 
constitutes only “a mere cup (2 per cent) of the Amazon, perhaps a glass (15 per cent) of 
the Mississippi, or at best a pitcher (20 per cent) of the Mekong.” 
6 M. Woodhouse & M. Zeitoun (2008), “Hydro-hegemony and International Water Law: 
Grappling with the Gaps of Power and Law”, 10 Water Policy Supplement 2, p. 113. The 
authors describe Egypt’s hegemonic position in the Nile basin as a malign form of hydro-
hegemony maintained in utter disregard of the principles of international water law.  
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comparatively poor and rancorous inter-riparian relationship,7 and the absence 
of an inclusive legal framework are some of the major hurdles8 which have 
forced many observers to make ominous predictions of conflict over the Nile 
waters.9 
Although the basin embarked on a new era of unprecedented cooperation and 
optimism following the launching, in February 1999, of the Nile Basin Initiative 
(NBI), hard-won rapprochement began to give way to acrimonious dispute 
following rejection of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) by Egypt 
and Sudan. At the heart of the problem lies the fate, vis-à-vis the CFA, of 
“existing treaties”, i.e., the 1929 and 1959 treaties on the basis of which Egypt 
and Sudan claim historical rights over the entire flow of the Nile. In common 
legal parlance, the problem pertains to disagreement over a proposed 
amendment to Article 14(b) of the CFA on water security. In reality though, it 
signifies an about-face on the shared vision of the NBI10 which affirms the 
determination of Egypt and Sudan to deny upstream riparian countries of their 
right to any consumptive utilization of the Nile waters.   
This article argues that the launching of the GERD at a critical moment in the 
history of Nile riparian cooperation offers a unique opportunity for change as it 
represents a potent counter-hegemonic measure the recalcitrant downstream 
riparian states cannot afford to be indifferent about. The first real opportunity 
for change towards cooperative development and equitable utilization, it will be 
argued, is however threatened by unfolding developments which might 
neutralize the impact of the GERD and institutionalize the untenable status quo 
in a new legal framework involving erosion of the fundamental principles of 
international water law.    
 
 
                                           
7 For a discussion of the poor inter-riparian relationship and the reasons thereof, see Dereje 
Z. Mekonnen (2013), “The Quest for Equitable Resolution of the Nile Waters Dispute: 
Wandering in the Wilderness?” International Journal of Ethiopian Studies VII (1 & 2), 
pp. 81-87.     
8 For a detailed discussion of the various challenges, see Dereje Z. Mekonnen (2011), 
“Between the Scylla of Water Security and Charybdis of Benefit Sharing: The Nile Basin 
Cooperative Framework Agreement – Failed or Just Teetering on the Brink?” Goettingen 
Journal of International Law 3(1), pp. 349-355.  
9 J. Kerisel (2001), The Nile and its Masters: Past, Present, Future (Rotterdam: A.A. 
Balkema Publishers), p. 164; Kliot, supra note 5, p. 18. 
10 The NBI was launched under the shared vision “to achieve sustainable socio-economic 
development through the equitable utilization of, and benefits from, the common Nile 
Basin water resources.” Claiming historical right over the entire flow and thus denying 
other riparian states of any share thereof obviously negates the very substance of the 
shared vision. 
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1. The Untenable Status Quo 
The status quo in the Nile basin is the product of lopsided colonial treaties 
which, in total disregard to the rights of other riparian states, were designed to 
serve British colonial interests downstream in Egypt and Sudan. As a result, the 
basin exhibits a distinctively inequitable pattern of water utilization not seen in 
any other international basin. Although the Nile is shared by 11 riparian states 
with burgeoning populations and economies highly dependent on agriculture, 
the status quo vests Egypt and Sudan –downstream riparian states with little or 
negative contribution–11 with  exclusive right over the entire flow. It is this 
extremely inequitable state of affairs which Egypt and Sudan claim as their non-
negotiable historical right. This claim, which has recently been rebranded as 
‘water security’, has its roots in the 1929 Agreement which was further 
reinforced by the 1959 Agreement. Both agreements, however, have no legal 
force binding upon the upstream riparian states and hence, the inequitable status 
quo they allegedly undergird has no basis in international law.  
1.1. The 1929 Agreement 
Concluded through the exchange of notes between Egypt and the United 
Kingdom, the 1929 agreement12 constitutes the mainstay of the status quo in the 
Nile basin. The agreement allocated the then utilizable flow of the Nile to Egypt 
and Sudan in the ratio of 48 and 4 billion cubic metres as their respective 
‘acquired rights’.13 The agreement was made in the aftermath of a political 
tension between the governments of Britain and Egypt which reached its peak in 
1924 when Egyptian nationalists demanding unity of Sudan with Egypt killed 
the British Governor-General of Sudan.14 Britain responded with a threat to 
reduce the flow of the Nile by an unlimited increase in Sudanese irrigation.15 
When the matter was finally settled in 1929, Egypt recognized Sudan’s right to 
                                           
11 Kliot, supra note 5, pp. 23, 25 and 39, pointing out the fact that Egypt and Sudan are 
points of great water loss in the Nile basin. The Sudd swamp in the South Sudan is the 
point of the biggest loss where between 12 and 30 billion cubic metres of water is lost 
annually. In Egypt, between 12 and 15 billion cubic metres of water is lost annually due to 
evaporation from Lake Nasser in addition to the 0.6 to 2 billion cubic metres lost annually 
due to seepage. 
12 Agreement on the Use of the Waters of the River Nile for Irrigation Purposes, concluded 
on the 7th of May 1929, in Cairo, available at  
    http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/92ENG.pdf (last visited 20 July 2017). 
13 Tesfaye Tafesse (2001), The Nile Question: Hydropolitics, Legal Wrangling, Modus 
Vivendi and Perspectives (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers), pp. 74-75. 
14 J. Dellapenna (1997), “The Nile as a Legal and Political Structure”, in E. Brans et al 
(eds.), The Scarcity of Water: Emerging Legal and Policy Responses (Kluwer Law 
International), p. 125. 
15  Ibid. 
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utilize an increased quantity of the Nile waters while Britain, in addition to 
recognizing Egypt’s natural and historical rights in the Nile waters, agreed to 
make safeguarding of the rights a fundamental principle of its policy.16 
The agreement which was concluded eight decades ago between Egypt and 
Britain is claimed to have a continued binding force on the former British 
colonies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania as successor riparian states. For the 
obvious fact that Ethiopia was never a British colony, any discussion on whether 
or not the 1929 agreement has a continued binding force is of no relevance. The 
claim though has no legal basis even with regards to the former British colonies 
as it is rooted in the theory of universal succession which entails the compulsory 
transfer of all the rights and obligations of the predecessor state to its 
successors.17 International law applies, with regards to succession to treaties, the 
clean slate (tabula rasa) theory which relieves the successor states of any duty 
to be bound by the obligations of the predecessor state.18 Contrary to the 
unfounded claim of wholesale transmission of treaty rights and obligations, 
succession in respect of the 1929 agreement has entailed “discontinuity of all 
rights and obligations completely and automatically”.19 
The independent successor states could, of course, extend the binding effect 
of the agreement either through the conclusion of devolution agreements or by 
declaring to be bound by it.20 What they did upon independence though is the 
exact opposite: Tanganyika (now Tanzania) declared the 1929 agreement not 
binding upon it in identical notes addressed to the governments of Britain, Egypt 
and Sudan on 4 July 1964; Uganda and Kenya followed Tanganyika in rejecting 
the agreement on the same grounds.21 There is, therefore, no legal basis to 
ensure the continued binding force of the 1929 agreement even on the former 
British colonies of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.22 
                                           
16 Dereje Z. Mekonnen (2010), “The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement 
Negotiations and the Adoption of a Water Security Paradigm: Flight into Obscurity or a 
Logical Cul-de-sac?” European Journal of International Law 21(2), p. 432.   
17 Id., pp. 432-433. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Yilma Mekonnen (1986), “State Succession in Africa: Selected Problems”, 200 Recueil de 
Cours international (V),   pp. 107-108. 
20 Dereje, supra note 16, p. 434. 
21 S. McCaffrey (2001), The Law of International Watercourses: Non-Navigational Uses 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 245-246.  
22 P. Howell (1994), “East Africa’s Water Requirements: the Equatorial Nile Project and the 
Nile Waters Agreement of 1929: A Brief Historical Review”, in P. Howell & J. Allan 
(eds.), The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: An Historical and Technical Review of 
Water Management and of Economical and Legal Issues (Cambridge University Press), p. 
86. The claim is not only bereft of any legal basis in international law but is also factually 
unfounded. Through the East African Nile Waters Coordinating Committee established in 
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1.2. The 1959 Agreement 
The Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters23 signed by Egypt and 
Sudan on 8 November 1959 is a patently anomalous deal which, though a purely 
bilateral treaty entered into between two downstream riparian states making 
very little contribution to the flow, “seeks to apportion the entire flow of the 
Nile to Egypt and Sudan, excluding the interests of any other riparian, notably 
Ethiopia”.24 
The agreement reaffirmed the ‘acquired rights’ of Egypt and Sudan to 48 and 
4 billion cubic meters respectively. It also allocated the 22 billion cubic metres 
of Nile water to be made available through the construction of the Sudd el Ali 
(Aswan) and Roseires dams to Egypt and Sudan which received 7.5 and 14.5 
billion cubic metres respectively realizing, thereby, the full control and 
utilization of the Nile waters by the two parties.25 The agreement has 
apportioned the entire flow of the Nile to Egypt and Sudan, further raising their 
respective share to 55.5 and 18.5 billion cubic metres and leaving, thus, literally 
no water for the nine upstream riparian states. 
Unlike the 1929 Agreement, the 1959 Agreement is the first agreement 
concluded by independent riparian states. In terms of substance and objective, 
however, it is not different from the 1929 agreement as it purportedly created a 
complete monopoly over the waters of the Nile. Despite the baseless claim of 
the parties, the complete monopoly created by the agreement has no legal basis 
whatsoever. As a bilateral treaty signed by Egypt and Sudan, whatever rights 
and obligations it created bind only the parties.26 For the upstream riparian states 
which are third parties, the agreement is of no legal significance as it neither 
confers any right nor imposes any obligation on them.27 
 
                                                                                                            
1955 to represent the interests of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda with a view to determining 
a common policy, the East African governments had declared their inherent and 
indisputable right to a share of the Nile waters.  Likewise, the Government of Britain of 
the day had, in a 22 November 1955 Note to the Egyptian and Sudanese Governments, 
reserved the right of the East African territories to negotiate an agreed share of the Nile 
waters.  
23 Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic for the Full 
Utilization of the Nile Waters, Cairo (8November 1959) available at: 
     http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/110ENG.pdf (last visited 20 July 
2017) 
24 J. Brunnee & S. Toope (2002), “The Changing Nile Basin Regime: Does Law Matter?’, 
43 Harvard Int’l Law Journal, pp. 125-126. 
25 Dereje, supra note 16, p. 435. 
26 Articles 34 and 35, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.  
27 Id., Articles 34, 35 and 36.  
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2. International Water Law: The Fundamentals 
The international legal regime governing the utilization and management of 
shared international watercourses is anchored in the 1997 UN Convention on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.28 The 
Convention which is “generally regarded as reflecting the fundamental rules of 
customary international law applicable in the field,”29 sets forth general 
principles30 that govern the conduct of riparian states sharing international 
watercourses. The most fundamental principles which define the rights and 
obligations of riparian states are the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization and the obligation not to cause significant harm. 
2.1. Equitable and Reasonable Utilization 
Rooted in the principle of sovereignty, the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization affirms the right of riparian states to utilize, in their respective 
territories, an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.31 
The primary function of the principle is to establish “entitlement to the use of 
volumes of water or entitlement to undertake certain activities on an 
international watercourse.”32 It is a principle “chiefly […] governing 
apportionment, or allocation, of water between states sharing an international 
watercourse”.33 In terms of normative status, there is “no rule of international 
law concerning the use of international watercourses more fundamental than that 
of equitable and reasonable utilization.”34 
Determination of what is equitable and reasonable in a given case is made by 
taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances an indicative list of 
which is provided under Article 6 of the UN Watercourses Convention.35 The 
                                           
28 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
1997, (1997) 36 ILM 700.  
29 A. Grzybowski, S. McCaffrey & R. Paisley (2010), “Beyond International Water Law: 
Successfully Negotiating Mutual Gains Agreements for International Watercourses”, 22 
Global Business & Development Law Journal, p. 141.      
30 The general principles provided for in part two of the Convention are: equitable and 
reasonable utilization and participation, factors relevant to equitable and reasonable 
utilization, obligation not to cause significant harm, general obligation to cooperate, 
regular exchange of data and information, and relationship between different kinds of 
uses.  
31 UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 28, Article 5. 
32 X. Fuentes (1998), “Sustainable Development and the Equitable Utilization of 
International Watercourses”, 69 British Yearbook of International Law, p. 137.      
33 S. McCaffrey, supra note 21, p. 325. 
34 Grzybowski, McCaffrey & Paisley, supra note 29, p. 141. 
35 The non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to the determination of equitable and 
reasonable utilization listed under Article 6 are: (a) geographic, hydrographic, 
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fact that the Convention mentions “existing and potential uses of the 
watercourse” among the factors to be taken into account in the determination of 
equitable and reasonable utilization signifies the illegitimacy of the ‘historical 
rights’ claim Egypt and Sudan make to the entire flow of the Nile. 
2.2. Obligation Not to Cause Significant Harm 
In the context of shared international watercourses where all riparian states have 
the right to equitable and reasonable utilization in their respective territories, 
there is a higher likelihood for violation of the rights of some riparian states by 
others. The obligation not to cause significant harm is another fundamental 
principle of international water law which circumscribes the right to equitable 
and reasonable utilization by obliging watercourse states, while utilizing an 
international watercourse in their territories, “to take all appropriate measures to 
prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse states.”36 
In view of the significant impact the obligation has in determining the 
legitimacy and propriety of a given utilization, understanding the true purport of 
the prohibition is crucial. Accordingly, what the obligation pertains to is “harm 
as a legal injury” and not to “factual harm”. Hence, “what is prohibited is 
conduct by which one state exceeds its equitable share, or deprives another state 
of its equitable share of the uses and benefits of the watercourse.”37 
Application of the obligation thus presupposes a prior determination of the 
specific rights of riparian states where any utilization in excess of one’s 
equitable share or depriving another state of the same would be a violation of 
international law. In the absence of a legal framework determining the specific 
rights of riparian states, there is no room for application of the obligation. In the 
context of the Nile basin though, it is Egypt and Sudan which, by apportioning 
the entire flow to themselves and foreclosing future uses by upstream riparian 
states,38stand in flagrant violation of the obligation. Being downstream riparian 
                                                                                                            
hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character; (b) social & 
economic needs of watercourse states; (c) population dependent on the watercourse; (d) 
effects of use in one watercourse state on other watercourse states; (e) existing and 
potential uses; (f) conservation, protection, development and economy of use and the costs 
of measures taken to that effect; and (g) the availability of alternatives, of comparable 
value, to a particular planned or existing use.  
36 UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 28, Article 7(1). 
37 S. McCaffrey (1986), “Second Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses”, 2 Yearbook of International Law Commission 2(1), p. 133.  
38 Downstream riparian states in general and Egypt and Sudan in particular tend to perceive 
the obligation as proscribing upstream riparian states from making use of the shared 
watercourse even when such legitimate exercise of a right causes only factual harm.  
Contrary to this erroneous understanding, the obligation proscribes downstream 
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states, there is little they can do to foreclose utilization by upstream riparian 
states. It is evident, therefore, that the untenable status quo and the unfounded 
claim to veritable ownership of the entire flow of the Nile would inevitably 
crumble if and when significant hydraulic projects like the GERD become 
reality. 
3. The GERD:  A Harbinger of Change?   
The quest for equity and fairness in the utilization of the Nile waters spans a 
period of over five decades with a series of unsuccessful cooperative 
initiatives.39 In spite of the immense hope and optimism which surrounded the 
launching of such initiatives, change in the inequitable status quo has proven to 
be more of a chimera than an attainable objective. The history of basin-wide 
cooperative initiatives from Undugu to the NBI is a history of failure in terms of 
bringing about change in the iniquitous status quo. 
Launched in 1983 upon the proposal of Egypt, Undugu was the first basin-
wide cooperation initiative which served as a platform for the discussion of 
matters pertaining to the Nile waters within a broad array of issues including 
agriculture, resource development, promotion of economic, technical and 
scientific cooperation among the riparian states.40 The five founding members of 
Undugu – Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, the DRC and the Central African Republic – 
were joined by Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania whereas Ethiopia and Kenya 
participated as observers.41 
Compared to the prevalent pattern of riparian cooperation the hallmarks of 
which were bilateralism and exclusive focus on technical issues, Undugu could 
be regarded as a major step  forward as it involved almost all the riparian 
countries and purported to address a wide spectrum of issues. It also succeeded 
in making modest contributions to the development of the basin through fact-
finding activities carried out with the support of the UNDP to help the 
formulation of a comprehensive economic plan including water resource 
development.42  
In terms of bringing about change in the basin’s inequitable status quo, or 
even the hope for such a change, Undugu was a complete failure which arguably 
undermined the incipient mutual trust amongst riparian states. The primary 
reason for the failure and subsequent deterioration of inter-riparian relations was 
                                                                                                            
utilizations which foreclose or curtail future uses upstream (Grzybowski, McCaffrey and 
Paisley, supra note 29, p. 142). 
39 Dereje, supra note 7, pp. 81-87.    
40 Ibid., p. 85. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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lack of genuine commitment on the part of Egypt which used the initiative as a 
tool for hegemonic influence.43 In a manner typical of an oppressive hydro-
hegemon,44 Egypt insisted that the top agenda of Undugu should be hydropower 
generation through joint hydroelectric projects connecting the national 
electricity grids of the riparian countries proceeding, at the same time, with its 
own giant irrigation and land reclamation projects.45 Abused by its progenitor 
and perceived, arguably appropriately, as an Egyptian ploy to contain the 
upstream riparian states,46 Undugu evanesced leaving the riparian states in a 
state of deeper mistrust and suspicion.  
The history of the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of 
the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile (Tecconile), another 
basin-wide cooperative scheme initiated by Egypt, is not different from its 
predecessor in terms of bringing about change in the status quo. Although it was 
considered to be a new arrangement which had managed to stave off the 
political dominance Egypt has had on Undugu,47 Tecconile remained strongly 
technical in its focus thereby constraining upstream riparian countries like 
Ethiopia from becoming full members.48 One remarkable achievement of the 
Tecconile is, of course, the Nile River Action Plan which was formally 
approved by the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs in 1995 in Arusha, 
Tanzania.49 In much the same way as that of Undugu, the significance of 
Tecconile was neutralized as an important component of the Action Plan on 
Regional Cooperation which envisaged the establishment of a basin-wide legal 
and institutional framework failed to materialize.50 
Tecconile was, one can argue, redeemed from being a total failure by 
Ethiopia’s insistence on the inclusion of the determination of equitable 
entitlement of riparian states to the Nile waters as a priority issue in the Action 
Plan. Unanimously approved as a priority project and incorporated into the 
Action Plan as such, the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework provided the basis 
                                           
43 Ibid. 
44 M. Woodhouse & M. Zeitoun M (2008), “Hydro-hegemony and International Water Law: 
Grappling with the Gaps of Power and Law”, 10 Water Policy, Supplement 2, p. 113.           
45 Ibid. 
46 A. Soffer (1999), Rivers of Fire: The Conflict over Water in the Middle East (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), p. 62. The initiative was launched with the 
objective of maintaining the status quo by preventing the utilization of the Nile waters 
upstream and Undugu was intended to be a tool for the supervision and control of Nile 
water utilization upstream. 
47 Brunee & Toope, supra note 24, p. 133. 
48 Dereje, supra note 16, p. 427. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Brunnee & Toope, supra note 24, p. 135. 
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for the next basin-wide cooperative initiative launched in 1999 in the form of 
the NBI.51  
The launching of the NBI was a milestone which evoked immense hope and 
optimism unprecedented in the basin’s history. What made the NBI radically 
different from previous initiatives was the determination, from the outset, of the 
basin states to make the long eschewed issue of equitable utilization of the Nile 
waters a centerpiece of the new initiative by endorsing achievement of 
“sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, 
and benefits from, the common Nile Basin water resources” as their Shared 
Vision.  
The potential profound change in the basin’s unfavourable hydro-political 
configuration52 adoption of the Shared Vision was believed to bring about was 
critical in motivating the reluctant upstream riparians into full membership and 
participation in the NBI process. The initiative brought about a “remarkable 
shift in the tone and substance of state-to-state relationships”53 ushering in a new 
era of rapprochement and cooperation which made possible the negotiation of 
an inclusive legal and institutional framework for over a decade.54  
In spite of the relentless decade-long effort to make it a success, the NBI 
could not escape failure55 as the CFA which would have sealed the onset of a 
real change and progress was rejected by Egypt and Sudan, following which 
inter-riparian relationships rapidly deteriorated as rapprochement and optimism 
soon gave way to unprecedented rancor and sabre-rattling. This unfortunate turn 
of events compels an inquiry into whether there is any room left for cooperative 
development and shared utilization of the Nile waters. Given the obstinate 
stance of Egypt and Sudan with regards to the CFA, one would be justified to 
surmise that the initial endorsement of the Shared Vision by the two 
downstream riparian countries was a hegemonic ploy to preempt or delay 
unilateral actions by upstream riparian countries and buy time to pursue their 
own unilateral hydraulic projects.56 
The situation has given upstream riparians, notably Ethiopia, the hard lesson 
that change in the inequitable status quo will not come from the negotiating 
                                           
51 Dereje, supra note 16, p. 427. 
52 Dereje, supra note 8, pp. 349-350. 
53 Brunnee & Toope, supra note 24, p. 132. 
54 For a detailed discussion of the negotiation process and the challenges, see Dereje, supra 
note 16, pp. 427-431. 
55 A. Cascão (2009), “Changing Power Relations in the Nile River Basin: Unilateralism vs. 
Cooperation?” Water Alternatives 2(2), p. 263.       
56 Dereje Z. Mekonnen (2010), “From Tenuous Legal Arguments to Securitization and 
Benefit Sharing: Hegemonic Obstinacy – the Stumbling Block against Resolution of the 
Nile Waters Question”, Mizan Law Review 4(2), p. 234.       
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table. For Ethiopia, the lesson has an element of a déjà vu reminiscent of the 
1950s where a formal objection to its exclusion from the negotiation of the 1959 
Agreement received no attention and thus made no impact.57 Egypt and Sudan 
ignored Ethiopia’s plea and signed the 1959 Agreement which allocated the 
entire flow between them leaving nothing for the country contributing 86% of 
the flow. Ethiopia seems, this time around, to have taken its lessons from history 
that mere assertion of a right, however legitimate and well founded in law and 
equity, does not make a difference in reality unless the claimant demonstrates 
resolve to back it up with action.  
Launched after almost all efforts for cooperative development have been 
frustrated,58 the GERD has proven to be a potent counter-hegemonic measure 
which jolted the malign hydro-hegemon59 hitherto unwilling to acknowledge the 
fundamental rights of upstream riparian countries. The GERD as such is, 
undoubtedly, a harbinger of change in a basin locked for decades in a hydro-
hegemonic stasis60 impervious to even moderate change. Whether the apparently 
inevitable change would materialize and ensure equitable utilization of the Nile 
waters by all basin states is far from certain as normative compliance producing 
mechanisms set in motion following the launching of the GERD pose a real 
challenge of institutionalizing the status quo to the advantage of the hydro-
hegemon. 
4. Twin Challenges Posed by the DoP 
The inequitable status quo in the Nile basin has been sustained mainly by the 
overwhelming power asymmetry undergirding Egyptian hegemony61 which was 
reinforced by the enduring weaknesses of upstream riparian countries which 
could not go beyond making claims to equitable and reasonable share of the 
                                           
57 M. Whiteman (1964), Digest of International Law (US Government Printing House), pp. 
1011-1012. 
58 R. Tawfik (2016), “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: a Benefit Sharing Project in 
the Eastern Nile?”, Water International 41(4), p. 577.  Some Joint Multipurpose Projects 
abandoned following Egypt’s rejection of the CFA and its withdrawal from the NBI 
include all efforts at cooperative development through JMPs under the auspices of the 
NBI frustrated by Egypt’s rejection of the CFA and its withdrawal from the NBI: pre-
feasibility study of Karadobi hydropower project with installed capacity of 1600 MW; 
pre-feasibility studies of the Border Dam (now the GERD), a hydropower project with a 
storage capacity of 14.5 BCM and an installed capacity of 800 MW, and Mandaya 
hydropower project with an installed capacity of 2400-2800 MW, all finalized in 2008. 
59 Woodhouse & Zeitoun, supra note 44, p. 113. 
60A. Cascão & A. Nicol (2016), “GERD: New Norms of Cooperation in the Nile Basin?” 
Water International 41(4), p. 552.      
61 A. Cascão (2008), “Ethiopia–Challenges to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile Basin”, 10 
Water Policy Supplement 2, p. 15.       
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waters doing little, in terms of launching hydraulic projects, to challenge the 
inequitable pattern of utilization. Continuation of the status quo has also been 
made possible by the successive cooperative initiatives which served, in large 
measure, as instruments of hegemonic control to stall potential developments 
upstream.62  
The launching of the GERD marks the first ever real challenge to the status 
quo which may induce a positive transformation in the basin by forcing the 
recalcitrant hydro-hegemon to accept the best scenario of cooperative 
development and shared utilization within the permanent legal and institutional 
framework brought into existence by the CFA. The likelihood of this scenario 
being pursued though is very slim as both Egypt and Sudan still believe in the 
possibility of perpetuating the status quo and have, to this end, adopted a two-
pronged strategy aimed at thwarting the transformative impact of the GERD and 
institutionalizing the status quo by eroding the fundamental principles of 
international water law.   
4.1. Institutionalization of the Status Quo 
The attempt to institutionalize the status quo by preempting the applicability of 
international water law as the framework within which the Nile waters question 
would find a lasting solution may be traced back to the inclusion of the principle 
of water security in the CFA. Although the principle was included with the hope 
and belief that it would help overcome the impasse in the negotiation process, it 
has turned out to be a Trojan horse of the inequitable status quo.63 The claim to 
exclusive right over the entire flow of the Nile pursued under the mantra of 
‘historical rights’ which the principle of water security was hoped to dispel 
reappeared using the same principle as a convenient cloak.  
Apparently a minor difference over a proposed amendment to a sub-
provision of the CFA (Article 14/b), the proper impact of the proposal in terms 
of redefining the substance of International Water Law in a manner conducive to 
the institutionalization of the status quo should not be overlooked. A closer 
reading of the proposal64 shows that it introduces two changes which would 
significantly redefine water security to mean an acknowledgement of the 
veritable ownership Egypt and Sudan claim over the entire flow of the Nile. The 
                                           
62 Dereje, supra note 7, pp. 81-87. 
63 Id., pp. 90-92. 
64 Annexed with the CFA to be resolved by the Nile River Basin Commission within six 
months of its establishment, Article 14(b) to which all countries except Egypt and Sudan 
agreed spells out the obligation “not to significantly affect the water security of any other 
Nile Basin state.”  Egypt proposed a different formulation to replace the agreed version 
with obligation “not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of 
any other Nile Basin State.”   
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first change replaces the word “significant” by “adverse” thereby lowering the 
threshold of harm below the international law standard. The second and far 
more sinister change extends the scope of the obligation to include “current uses 
and rights”. Given the fact that Egypt and Sudan are currently using the entire 
annual flow, the proposal signifies a position antithetical to the fundamental 
principles of international water law demanding upstream riparian states to 
forego their right to equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile waters. 
The DoP signed on 25 March 2015 by Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan65 
represents another challenge providing a new legal basis for the 
institutionalization of the status quo with little concession for upstream riparian 
Ethiopia. Although Egypt was intent on blocking implementation of the GERD 
project by all means,66 realization of its inability to stop the GERD which rather 
came to be a fact on the ground is the primary consideration which forced a 
change in strategy.67 Egypt, thus, came back to the negotiation process and 
signed the DoP with the objective of institutionalizing the status quo by a 
normative limitation of upstream riparian rights to non-consumptive utilization 
– essentially, hydropower generation.  
The first prong of the new strategy is evident in the substance of the second 
principle of the DoP which, in spite of its alluring caption, limits the purpose of 
the GERD to power generation.68 With regards to the GERD, therefore, the 
exclusive consumptive utilization of the Nile waters by Egypt and Sudan has 
been transformed from being a challenged fact on the ground into a legal reality 
Ethiopia is bound to honor and respect. The trajectory of the new strategy 
                                           
65 Agreement on Declaration of Principles between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of the Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam Project, signed at Khartoum, Sudan; official text available at 
http://www.hornaffairs.com/en/2015/03/25/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-agreement-on-
declaration-of-principles-full-text (last visited 15 July 2017). 
66 Tawfik, supra note 58, pp. 580-581. Egypt’s initial response to the GERD was vehement 
opposition alleging violation by Ethiopia of international law, especially the obligation not 
to cause significant harm and the principles of prior notification and consultation as well 
as obligations under the 1902 treaty and the 1993 agreement both of which, allegedly, 
prohibit construction of the GERD as it would cause appreciable harm to Egypt. When 
Morsi assumed the Presidency, the challenge took the old-fashioned tactics of 
“threatening to use force if Egypt’s share of the Nile waters were affected, insisting that 
Egypt accepted no infringements on its water security.” 
67Ibid. Tawfik explains Egypt’s acceptance of the GERD as an unavoidable fact on the 
ground as a result of the realization of “the limitations of employing the empty rhetoric of 
threatening to use force, and referring to legal means.” 
68 The Second Principle on the GERD, captioned Principle of Development, Regional 
Integration and Sustainability, reads: “The purpose of GERD is for power generation, to 
contribute to economic development, promotion of transboundary cooperation and 
regional integration through generation of sustainable and reliable clean energy supply.” 
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becomes even more evident when the questionable limitation of the purpose of 
the GERD –a national project fully financed by Ethiopia– to power generation is 
contrasted with huge hydraulic projects launched by Egypt and Sudan with no 
discussion on what their purposes should be. The Southern Valley (Toshka) 
project in Egypt and Merowe Dam in the Sudan are prime examples.   
Launched in 1997 for the purpose of reclaiming some 3.4 million feddans of 
agricultural land using 5.5 billion cubic metre of Nile waters pumped out of 
Lake Nasser, the project is expected to provide home for about 7 million 
Egyptians to be moved to the Southern Valley.69 With its objection conveniently 
ignored, all Ethiopia could do then was to make its position clear, through a 
March 20, 1997 note verbale to Egypt, that “it will not allow its share to the Nile 
waters to be affected by a fait accompli such as the Toshka project, regarding 
which it was neither consulted nor alerted.”70  
The Merowe Dam (Merowe Multi-Purpose Project), “Sudan’s largest and 
most significant water project” with annual electricity yield of 1250 MW and 
the potential for irrigation of up to 20,000 ha of land71 was completed in 2008. 
No upstream riparian country was “consulted or alerted” and Egypt, in spite of 
its concern about the irrigation plans, accepted the Merowe as a fact merely 
contending that its use should not go beyond power generation.72   
The DoP which has become the latest vehicle for institutionalization of the 
inequitable status quo has been portrayed as a success for upstream riparian 
countries allegedly signifying recognition by Egypt and Sudan of “the equality 
of all the Nile states” and acknowledgement by both of “the right of these states 
to utilize the waters of the Nile for the sustainable development of their 
people”.73 No part of the DoP, however, warrants such a wildly optimistic 
reading and, contrary to this unwarranted optimism, the Egyptian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has made it abundantly clear that it “will not affect historical 
agreements and the water share allocated in these agreements.”74 The 
                                           
69 S. Lonergan & A. Wolf (2001), “Moving Water to Move People The Toshka Project in 
Egypt A Water Forum Contribution”, Water International 26(4), p. 590. The enormous 
cost of the project (considered as Mubarak’s Pyramid) out of which only 20 to 25 percent 
is to be borne by the government is claimed to be the reason behind Egypt’s involvement 
with the NBI which was used as a symbol of riparian cooperation to bring World Bank 
investment into Egypt (Id., 591, 593).      
70 S. Salman (2010), “Downstream Riparians Can Also Harm Upstream Riparians: The 
Concept of Foreclosure of Future Uses”, Water International 35(4), p. 358.       
71 M. Saleh (2008), “Hydro-hegemony in the Nile Basin: a Sudanese Perspective”, 10 Water 
Policy Supplement 2, p. 33.       
72 S. Salman (2016), “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: The Road to the Declaration 
of Principles and the Khartoum Document”, Water International 41(4), p. 514.     
73 Id., p. 522. 
74 Tawfik, supra note 58, p. 582. 
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unwarranted optimism about the DoP has also been reinforced by an equally 
unwarranted perception of Sudan’s political support for the GERD75 as “a 
ground shaking decision which virtually ended its more than half a century Nile 
alliance with Egypt.”76  
In view of the fact that Sudan has become increasingly dependent on 
irrigation agriculture as a result of the huge loss of oil revenue entailed by the 
secession of the South Sudan,77 its support for the GERD is predicated on a 
pragmatic consideration of the variegated benefits the Dam avails to it,78 the 
most important one being expansion of its irrigation potential79 using the 
regulated flow of the Blue Nile –a huge benefit of GERD it will enjoy with no 
cost. The DoP, thus, signifies a renewed convergence of strategic objectives 
rather than the waning of half a century of alliance between Egypt and Sudan.   
4.2. Erosion of the Fundamental Principles of International Water Law  
The relevance and irreplaceable role of International Water Law in bringing 
about a durable solution for the restive Nile basin cannot be disputed. The 
prospect for such a solution has, however, been significantly undermined by a 
series of factors including stagnation of the NBI,80 “riparian race to unilaterally 
capture as much of the resource as possible through a multitude of giant 
hydraulic projects”81 and rejection of the CFA which is indicative of a far more 
serious challenge –rejection of international water law as the appropriate 
framework within which the Nile waters question should be resolved. In light of 
this, cutting a deal with two recalcitrant riparian states who stand in opposition 
to the CFA showing no signs of moderation does not bode well for the CFA and 
                                           
75Id., p. 579. Sudan’s political support for the GERD is predicated on the potential benefits 
of the project in terms of flow regulation which would significantly increase the irrigated 
agricultural and reduction in sedimentation which would improve the operation of its 
dams. 
76 Salman, supra note 72, p. 518. 
77Tawfik, supra note 58, p. 585. 
78 D. Whittington, J. Waterbury & M. Jeuland (2014), “The Grand Renaissance Dam and 
Prospects for Cooperation on the Eastern Nile”, 16 Water Policy, p. 600.     
79 A. Tesfaye (2014), “Conflict and Cooperation and the Evolution of the Nascent Nile 
Basin Regime”, Northeast African Studies 14(1), p.130. Sudan has planned expansion of 
its irrigated agriculture from 2 to 4.8 million ha requiring 25 billion cubic metre of 
additional water annually. See also A. Swain (2011), “Challenges for Water Sharing in the 
Nile Basin: Changing Geo-politics and Changing Climate”, Hydrological Sciences 
Journal 56(4),   p. 694, stating the fact that due to increased irrigation, potential demand 
for Nile waters in the Sudan is estimated to increase to 32 billion cubic metre by 2025. 
80 O. Yohannes & K. Yohannes (2012), “Turmoil in the Nile River Basin: Back to the 
Future?” Journal of Asian and African Studies 48(2), p. 204. 
81 Ibid. 
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undermines the common upstream position against the status quo painstakingly 
built over the years under the leadership of Ethiopia.82 
Purportedly an agreement on declaration of principles on the GERD Project, 
the DoP goes way beyond the specific issues pertinent to the Project and 
ventures into a treacherous redefinition of the core principles of International 
Water Law unanimously adopted as core principles of the CFA as well.83 The 
redefinition of core principles in the DoP involves significant omissions 
signaling “erosion of the norm-building feature of international law … by those 
seeking to maintain the status quo”.84 Principles III and IV of the DoP which 
provide for the principle not to cause significant harm and the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization, respectively, signify such erosion which 
arguably constitutes the second prong of the new strategy to perpetuate the 
status quo. 
As formulated in Principle III, the principle not to cause significant harm has 
undergone a substantive reformulation. The principle commits, in its first 
paragraph, the three countries “to take all appropriate measures to prevent the 
causing of significant harm in utilizing the Blue/Main Nile.” The second 
paragraph which involves a significant omission with serious normative 
repercussions reads: “Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to one of 
the countries, the state whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of 
agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures in consultations with the 
affected state to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to 
discuss the question of compensation.” 
This reformulation involves a significant omission of the phrase “having due 
regard for the provisions of Articles 5 and 6” found in Article 7(2) of the UN 
Watercourses Convention which is copied verbatim in Article 5(2) of the CFA.85 
                                           
82 Cascão & Nicol, supra note 60, p. 562. F. Lawson (2016), “Desecuritization, Domestic 
Struggles, and Egypt’s Conflict with Ethiopia over the Nile River”, Democracy and 
Security 12(1), p. 2, notes the fact that Egypt has given attention to maintaining good 
relations with White Nile riparian states of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania in a bid to ensure 
monopoly and isolate Ethiopia thereby weakening the common challenge to the status 
quo. 
83 It is important to note that out of the fifteen general principles of the CFA which 
constitute the normative foundation for the use, conservation and development of the Nile 
water resources, only one – the principle of water security – was and still continues to be a 
point of disagreement between Egypt and Sudan and the upstream riparian states.     
84 M. Zeitoun (2015), “The Relevance of International Water Law to Later-developing 
Upstream States”, Water International 40(7), p. 950.     
85 The reference in the CFA to Art 4 is exactly the same, in substance, to the reference to Art 
5 and 6 made in Art 7(2) of the WCC as Article 4 of the CFA provides, in one provision, 
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization together with relevant factors and 
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The implication of this arguably deliberate omission is immense as it dispenses 
with a crucial reference to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization 
and relevant factors and circumstances (Articles 5 and 6 of the UN 
Watercourses Convention and Article 4 of the CFA) which serve as important 
determinants of the type of prohibited harm falling within the ambit of the 
principle.   
Reformulation of the principle in the DoP has effectively removed an 
essential element of the principle which provides the point of reference for 
resolution of disputes regarding the legitimacy of a given utilization which 
might be challenged as causing significant harm –thus blurring the distinction 
between factual harm and harm constituting legal injury. Consequently, any 
harm would inevitably be classified as significant and be prohibited on account 
of factual considerations –a conflation of factual harm with legal injury which 
would legitimize the untenable status quo by prohibiting any consumptive 
utilization upstream.86  
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, redefined as Principle 
IV in the DoP, is the lynchpin of international water law unanimously accepted 
as one of the principles of the CFA. According to this principle, every riparian 
state is entitled, within its own territory, to a reasonable and equitable share of 
the waters. Hence, allocation where this has not taken place, and re-allocation in 
the case of the Nile basin where the entire flow has already been fully allocated 
between the two downstream riparian countries, is an unavoidable necessity 
which is an integral part and a necessary outcome of the principle.87  
Allocation / re-allocation is sine qua non not only for a proper understanding 
of what harm means in the context of the “no-significant harm” principle, but 
also for the practical implementation of the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization through the incipient mechanism of benefit sharing. Contrary to the 
alleged advantage of benefit sharing to obviate the daunting task of water 
allocation, the negotiation of water rights and of benefits are not alternative 
                                                                                                            
circumstances provided for under Art 5 and 6 of the UN Watercourses Convention, 
respectively. 
 86 Tawfik, supra note 58, p. 583. Egypt’s concern remains to be “the impact of the project 
on its historical share of the Nile water” which can only be maintained by proscription of 
consumptive use upstream. The signing of the DoP was fiercely opposed by some 
Egyptian policy circles for whom it “meant that Egypt would formally accept the GERD 
without legally committing Ethiopia to respect Egypt’s historical share” Id., p. 585. 
87 McCaffrey, supra note 21, pp. 325, 345; P. Birnie & A. Boyle (2002), International Law 
and the Environment   (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press), p. 303; A. Nollkaemper 
(1996), “The Contribution of the International Law Commission to International Water 
Law: Does it Reverse the Flight from Substance?” 27 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, pp. 39, 44.                   
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strategies; rather, “an explicit or implicit recognition or negotiation of property 
rights is a necessary precondition for the realization of a benefit sharing 
scheme”.88  
In spite of the centrality of re-allocation for a lasting resolution of the Nile 
waters question, the DoP has redefined the principle by carving out a section of 
the definition in Article 4 of the CFA which emphasizes the need for water 
sharing or allocation as an essential element of the principle. Compared to the 
definitions in Article 5 of the UN Watercourses Convention and Article 4 of the 
CFA,89 the definition in principle IV of the DoP90 which commits the three 
countries to “utilize their shared water resources in an equitable and reasonable 
manner” without any reference to the CFA or the UN Watercourses Convention 
is all but a mere shadow of the principle. Considered in conjunction with 
Principle II which limits the purpose of the GERD to power generation and the 
exclusion of any reference to water sharing or re-allocation which is an integral 
part of the principle clearly stipulated in Article 4 of the CFA, the principle has 
been substantially reformulated in such a way that it would provide a convenient 
normative basis for the beleaguered status quo. 
Conclusion 
Equitable and reasonable utilization of transboundary watercourses is a lofty 
objective, the realization of which depends on the proper implementation of the 
twin core principles of international water law: equitable and reasonable 
utilization and the obligation not to cause significant harm. The first is a 
constitutive principle which determines the rights of riparian states while the 
second is an interpretive principle which circumscribes the same.91 
Determination of what is equitable and reasonable in a given case is a 
responsibility of basin states which they should carry out through negotiation of 
                                           
88 I. Dombrowsky (2009), “Revisiting the Potential for Benefit Sharing in the Management 
of Trans-boundary Rivers”, 11 Water Policy, pp. 125, 137.    
89 Art. 4 of the CFA reads: “Nile Basin states shall in their respective territories utilize the 
water resources of the Nile River system and the Nile River Basin in an equitable and 
reasonable manner. In particular, those water resources shall be used and developed by 
Nile Basin States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of those water resources. 
Each basin state is entitled to an equitable and reasonable share in the beneficial uses of 
the water resources of the Nile River system and the Nile River Basin (emphasis added).” 
90 The corresponding definition of the principle in Principle III of the DoP reads: “The three 
countries shall utilize their shared water resources in their respective territories in an 
equitable and reasonable manner.” 
91 Fuentes, supra note 32, pp. 130-135; McCaffrey, supra note 21, p. 371; Birnie & Boyle, 
supra note 87, p. 308. 
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specific watercourse agreements.92 Once the specific rights of riparian states are 
determined in an inclusive agreement, the obligation not to cause significant 
harm circumscribes the right by obliging riparian states to take all appropriate 
measures to prevent the causing of significant harm constituting a legal injury to 
other riparian states.  
The status quo in the Nile basin negates these fundamental principles of 
international law as it allegedly vests Egypt and Sudan with exclusive right to 
the entire flow of the Nile. Their rejection of the CFA is evidence of their 
unwillingness to abide by the rules of international law. Being downstream 
riparian states, Egypt and Sudan can, however, do nothing to stop developments 
upstream and the absence of cooperation will harm them most. Besides, absence 
of an inclusive legal framework or rejection of the same by some riparian states 
as in the case of the CFA does not in any way prevent the exercise by riparian 
states of their sovereign right to equitable and reasonable utilization in their 
territories.  
The launching of the GERD after the frustration of almost every opportunity 
for cooperative development and shared utilization is a significant counter-
hegemonic measure capable of transforming the basin’s hydro-political 
configuration as evidenced by Egypt’s ultimate willingness to negotiate with 
Ethiopia. The context in which this negotiation was carried out and the 
substance of the final agreement in the form of the DoP, however, pose serious 
challenges for the prospect of change. In view of the unmitigated opposition of 
Egypt and Sudan to the CFA and the complete disengagement of the former 
from the NBI process, there is sufficient reason to beware of the consequences 
of a counterproductive flight away from cooperation into unilateralism and the 
erosion of fundamental principles of international water law through a 
patchwork of individual agreements for every hydraulic project upstream.    
The GERD is meant for a typical non-consumptive use –power generation– 
which does not involve flow reduction. It should, however, be clearly 
emphasized that Ethiopia’s undisputed sovereign right to equitable and 
reasonable utilization of the Nile to which it contributes 86% of the annual flow 
cannot be limited to the non-consumptive use of power generation. Reduction of 
the flow of the Nile as a result of consumptive utilization upstream should be 
acknowledged in every deal as an inevitability firmly anchored in international 
law.                                                                                                                        ■ 
 
                                           
92 This is evident from the language of Article 3 of the UN Watercourses Convention which, 
in paragraph three, provides that “[w]atercourse states may enter into one or more 
agreements … which apply and adjust the provisions of the present Convention to the 
characteristics and uses of a particular international watercourse or part thereof.” 
